

84TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. CON. RES. 2

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 14, 1955

Mr. MANSFIELD (for himself, Mr. BARRETT, Mr. BEALL, Mr. CAPEHART, Mr. CHAVEZ, Mr. COTTON, Mr. DANIEL, Mr. DUFF, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. FLANDERS, Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. GEORGE, Mr. GREEN, Mr. HILL, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. KEFAUVER, Mr. LANGER, Mr. LEHMAN, Mr. McNAMARA, Mr. MALONE, Mr. MORSE, Mr. MUNDT, Mr. MURRAY, Mr. NEELY, Mr. NEUBERGER, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. SMITHERS, Mrs. SMITH of Maine, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. WELKER, and Mr. YOUNG) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

1 *Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives*
2 *concurring)*, That there is hereby established a Joint Com-
3 mittee on Central Intelligence to be composed of six Mem-
4 bers of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the
5 Senate, and six Members of the House of Representatives
6 to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representa-
7 tives. Of the six members to be appointed from the Senate,
8 three shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency
9 Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the

1 Senate, and three shall be members of the Central Intelli-
2 gence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
3 Services of the Senate. Of the six members to be appointed
4 from the House of Representatives, three shall be members
5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the
6 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
7 tives, and three shall be members of the Central Intelligence
8 gency Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services
9 of the House of Representatives. Not more than four mem-
10 bers appointed from either the Senate or the House of
11 Representatives shall be from the same political party.

12 SEC. 2. (a) The joint committee shall make continuing
13 studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency
14 and of problems relating to the gathering of intelligence
15 affecting the national security and of its coordination and
16 utilization by the various departments, agencies, and instru-
17 mentalities of the Government. The Central Intelligence
18 Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently
19 informed with respect to its activities. All bills, resolutions,
20 and other matters in the Senate or the House of Representa-
21 tives relating primarily to the Central Intelligence Agency
22 shall be referred to the joint committee.

23 (b) The members of the joint committee who are
24 Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the
25 Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are

1 Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to
2 time report to the House, by bill or otherwise, their recom-
3 mendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction
4 of their respective Houses which are (1) referred to the
5 joint committee, or (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of
6 the joint committee.

7 SEC. 3. Vacancies in the membership of the joint com-
8 mittee shall not affect the power of the remaining members
9 to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be
10 filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selec-
11 tion. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a
12 vice chairman from among its members.

13 SEC. 4. The joint committee, or any duly authorized
14 subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings,
15 to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by sub-
16 pena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the
17 production of such books, papers, and documents, to ad-
18 minister such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such
19 printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it
20 deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to re-
21 port public hearings shall not be in excess of the amounts
22 prescribed by law for reporting the hearings of standing
23 committees of the Senate. The cost of such services to
24 report executive hearings shall be fixed at an equitable rate
25 by the joint committee.

1 SEC. 5. The joint committee is empowered to appoint
2 such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and
3 stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable.
4 The committee is authorized to utilize the services, infor-
5 mation, facilities, and personnel of the departments and
6 establishments of the Government.

7 SEC. 6. The expenses of the joint committee, which
8 shall not exceed \$ per year, shall be paid one-
9 half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half
10 from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives
11 upon vouchers signed by the chairman. Disbursements to
12 pay such expenses shall be made by the Secretary of the
13 Senate out of the contingent fund of the Senate, such con-
14 tingent fund to be reimbursed from the contingent fund of
15 the House of Representatives in the amount of one-half of
16 the disbursements so made.

out it, the National Security Council cannot succeed in assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our . . . military power, with sufficient continuity or definiteness to constitute a practical guide to the Military Establishment as to the size of our military needs.

It recommended that vigorous steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency and its work.

The purpose of the joint congressional committee would be in a sense to safeguard as well as to supervise the policies of the CIA. In my opinion the Congress should, because of the very nature of the work of the CIA, do everything in its power to protect its activities and to make it possible that the CIA, as an organization, will not lose its effectiveness, and will be able to continue its extremely important work in such a manner as to warrant the necessary amount of freedom of activity and the necessary security to perform the duties allocated to it under the law.

Mr. President, if a joint committee is established, CIA officials will no longer be defenseless against criticism because their lips are sealed. They would have a congressional channel to turn to. The joint committee, in turn, could maintain the confidence of Congress and the public, without loss of security.

To this end, Mr. President, I submit, on behalf of myself and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. BARRETT], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BEALL], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. CORSON], the Senator from Texas [Mr. DANIEL], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. DUFF], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], the senior Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], the senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE], the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], the junior Senator from Oregon [Mr. NEUBERGER], the junior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the junior Senator from Maine [Mr. PAYNE], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the senior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], the junior Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. WELKER], and the junior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG], a concurrent resolution to establish a joint committee on Central Intelligence, and ask for its appropriate reference.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The concurrent resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 2), submitted by Mr. MANSFIELD (for himself and other Senators) was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence to be composed of 6 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and 6 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Of the 6 members to be appointed from the Senate, 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. Of the 6 members to be appointed from the House of Representatives, 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and 3 shall be members of the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. Not more than 4 members appointed from either the Senate or the House of Representatives shall be from the same political party.

Sec. 2. (a) The joint committee shall make continuing studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and of problems relating to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security and of its coordination and utilization by the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government. The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or the House of Representatives relating primarily to the Central Intelligence Agency shall be referred to the joint committee.

(b) The members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to time report to the House, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are (1) referred to the joint committee, or (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

Sec. 3. Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

Sec. 4. The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report public hearings shall not be in excess of the amounts prescribed by law for reporting the hearings of standing committees of the Senate. The cost of such services to report executive hearing shall be fixed at an equitable rate by the joint committee.

Sec. 5. The joint committee is empowered to appoint such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable. The committee is authorized to utilize the

services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

Sec. 6. The expenses of the joint committee, which shall not exceed \$ per year, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives upon vouchers signed by the chairman. Disbursements to pay such expenses shall be made by the Secretary of the Senate out of the contingent fund of the Senate, such contingent fund to be reimbursed from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives in the amount of one-half of the disbursements so made.

CODE OF FAIR PROCEDURE FOR SENATE INVESTIGATIONS

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, I submit for appropriate reference a resolution embodying a code of fair procedures for Senate investigations. I ask unanimous consent that a statement prepared by me pertaining to the resolution be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the statement will be printed in the Record.

The resolution (S. Res. 22), submitted by Mr. BUSH (for himself and Mr. KUCHEL) was received and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved, That rule XCV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by deleting the title "Standing Committees" and inserting in lieu thereof "Senate Committees", and by inserting at the end of such rule the following:

"5. The following shall be the rules of the standing, select, and special committees of the Senate (except the majority and minority policy committee) and subcommittees thereof, and the term 'committee' as used in this subsection (except in paragraphs (a) (7) and (b) (1)) means any such committee or subcommittee:

"(a) (1) Committees may adopt additional rules not inconsistent with the rules of the Senate.

"(2) Unless otherwise provided, committee action shall be by vote of a majority of a quorum.

"(3) No committee hearing shall be held in any place outside the District of Columbia unless authorized by the committee.

"(4) All hearings conducted by committees shall be open to the public, except executive sessions for marking up bills or for voting on where the committee orders an executive session.

"(5) No measure, finding, or recommendation shall be reported from any committee unless a majority of the committee were actually present.

"(6) No testimony taken or material presented in an executive session shall be made public, either in whole or in part or by way of summary, unless authorized by the committee.

"(7) A subcommittee of any standing, select, or special committee may be authorized only by a majority vote of the members of such committee.

"(8) Authority to issue subpoenas may be delegated to the chairman or any member by the committee at a meeting called for such purpose.

"(9) A majority of the members of a committee may call a special meeting of such committee by filing a notice thereof with the committee clerk, who shall notify each member.

gress, at this session, has a clear public duty to proceed to enact legislation along the lines of the bill introduced by the distinguished Senator from Maine, so that we can bring under more effective control the traffic in narcotics in the United States.

FAMILY-FARM BILL OF RIGHTS

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and the Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY], I introduce and send to the desk, for appropriate reference, a joint resolution to state explicitly the long-standing national policy to preserve and strengthen the family-farm pattern of American agriculture, and to set forth some guideposts toward achieving that policy. Because some other Senators have expressed interest in the same objectives, I ask that joint resolution lie over for 1 legislative day, for the benefit of any other Senators who may care to join as cosponsors.

Since the earliest days of the Republic, the family-farm pattern of American agriculture has been considered as essential to a strong democracy, and the policy of the Nation has been to favor the establishment and preservation of family-owned and family-operated farms.

In this period of reexamination of farm programs and farm legislation, it should be useful to look first at the objectives we intend to serve, and to establish some policy guideposts against which all proposed farm legislation can be appraised for its usefulness in achieving our national objectives.

Ample precedent for establishing goals in the national interest as policy guides, and then reviewing our progress toward them, has been established in the Employment Act of 1946, a measure to encourage an expanding economy assuring full employment.

A desirable pattern of sound and prospering agriculture is closely related to the objective of a sound national economy, and is necessary to maintain full employment.

I ask unanimous consent that the joint resolution be printed in the RECORD following these remarks.

Mr. President, because some other Senators have expressed interest in the same objectives, I ask unanimous consent that the receipt and referral of the joint resolution be postponed to the next legislative day, in order to provide other Senators an opportunity to join in sponsoring the joint resolution.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, will be printed in the RECORD.

The joint resolution (S. J. Res. 20) to state explicitly the long-standing national policy to preserve and strengthen the family-farm pattern of American agriculture, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. HUMPHREY (for himself and Mr. MURRAY), was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Com-

mittee on Agriculture and Forestry, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD.

[The joint resolution will appear hereafter in the RECORD.]

JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, because of the very nature of the Central Intelligence Agency, I think that it is imperative that a joint congressional committee be established for the purpose of making continued studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and problems related to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security. I feel that there should be a joint congressional committee authorized, and that the CIA should, as a matter of law, keep that committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities.

The need for the Central Intelligence Agency is seldom questioned any longer and I certainly am not challenging it now. What I am concerned with, however, is CIA's position of responsibility to none but the National Security Council. I believe this should be changed. It is true that intelligence services of other major countries operate without direct control of the legislatures. This is understandable in a totalitarian government, such as the Soviet Union. It is even understandable in a parliamentary democracy, such as Great Britain where the entire administration is a part of and is responsible to Parliament. Our form of government, however, is based on a system of checks and balances. If this system gets seriously out of balance at any point the whole system is jeopardized and the way is opened for the growth of tyranny.

There has been almost no congressional inspection of the Central Intelligence Agency since the latter's establishment in 1947. It is conceivable that as the need for an intelligence service had been evident in 1946, the Congressional Reorganization Act of that year would have made provisions for congressional participation in the committee structure of Congress. As it is now, however, CIA is freed from practically every ordinary form of congressional check. Control of its expenditures is exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other Government agencies. Each year only a handful of Members in each House see the appropriation figures. There is no regular, methodical review of this Agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few Members of selected subcommittees.

I agree that an intelligence agency must maintain complete secrecy to be effective. If clandestine sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they would quickly dry up. Not only would the flow of information be cut off, but the lives of many would be seriously endangered. In addition, much of the value of the intelligence product would be lost if it were known that we possessed it. Secrecy for these purposes is obviously necessary.

However, there is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy. Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse. If we accept this idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake we will have no way of knowing whether we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one.

If a new committee is set up as proposed in this legislation, all bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or in the House of Representatives relating primarily to the CIA, would be referred to the joint committee; and the joint committee would, from time to time, make whatever reports are necessary to the Congress concerning its relationship with the CIA.

This resolution would establish a joint committee, composed of 6 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate and 6 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance, not more than 4 Members shall be of the same political party.

The joint committee or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof would be authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The committee is, in addition, empowered to appoint its staff; and is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

Mr. President, in my opinion, the CIA is in somewhat the same category as the Atomic Energy Commission; and just as a special committee, with well defined authority and powers has been created on a joint congressional basis to oversee and supervise the interests of the AEC, so I believe should a joint congressional committee be created for the same purpose in connection with the CIA. I realize full well, because of the very nature of the duties of the CIA, there there has been no public scrutiny of its activities. This may be necessary in this day and age, but I do believe that a joint congressional committee should be created for the purpose of seeing that good management is maintained in the CIA and also to keep a constant check on its intelligence policies. It is well, too, that this joint committee should be in a position to criticize any mistakes which the CIA may make.

Until a committee of the kind I am proposing is established, there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Central Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which it is shrouded. In 1949 the Hoover Commission examined the CIA. A task force stated that—

The Central Intelligence Agency has not yet achieved the desired degree of proficiency and dependability in its estimates. With-

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S. CON. RES. 2

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

To establish a Joint Committee on Central
Intelligence.

By Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. BARRETT, Mr. BEALL, Mr. CAPE-
HART, Mr. CHAVEZ, Mr. COTTON, Mr. DANIEL, Mr.
DUFF, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. FLANDERS, Mr. FULBRIGHT,
Mr. GEORGE, Mr. GREEN, Mr. HILL, Mr. HUMPHREY,
Mr. JACKSON, Mr. KEFAUVER, Mr. LANGER, Mr.
LEHMAN, Mr. McNAMARA, Mr. MALONE, Mr. MORSE,
Mr. MUNDT, Mr. MURRAY, Mr. NEELY, Mr. NEU-
BERGER, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. SMATHERS,
Mrs. SMITH of Maide, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. WELKER,
and Mr. YOUNG

JANUARY 14, 1955

Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration